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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
James Darnell Black appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for criminal
possession of a financial transaction card. On appeal, he argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to recuse for alleged bias; that the court abused its
sentencing discretion; and that the court committed fundamental error by stating that Black’s
criminal history spanned “most of the states” rather than “multiple states.”

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In its previous decision, the Court of Appeals set forth the relevant factual and procedural
history of this case. See State v. Black, 161 Idaho 867, 868-69, 392 P.3d 45, 46-47 (Ct. App.
2017). In sum, a police investigation revealed that Black had stolen credit card numbers from
several individuals and then used that information to make fraudulent purchases. Id. at 868, 392
P.3d at 46. The state charged Black with five counts each of possession of stolen property and
criminal possession of a financial transaction card, and with being a persistent violator of the
law. Id. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Black pleaded guilty to one count of criminal possession
of a financial transaction card and the state dismissed the remaining charges. Id.
The district court ordered a presentence investigation report. Id. at 869, 392 P.3d at 47.
In that report, Black self-reported that his mental health status was “serious” and claimed to have
been diagnosed with anxiety, depression, and bipolar disorder; to have previously attempted
suicide; and to have previously received treatment and been admitted to a psychiatric institution.
Id. Black’s claims of mental health issues were supported by letters from his mother and aunt;
by his claim that (after his current arrest) he was receiving treatment and was prescribed
medication while incarcerated elsewhere; by the assessment of his GAIN1 evaluator; and by a
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report filed by a state-certified counselor who had performed a mental health examination
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2524. Id.
Prior to sentencing, Black filed a pro se motion for a psychological evaluation pursuant
to Idaho Code § 19-2522, arguing that his mental condition would be a significant factor at
sentencing. Id. Black’s trial counsel also requested an evaluation, noting that Black alleged that
his mental condition would be a significant factor. Id. The district court denied the motion filed
by counsel, stating: “The Court has no reason to believe that the Defendant’s mental condition
will be a significant factor at sentencing. In addition, good cause has not been shown.” Id. The
district court then entered judgment against Black and sentenced him to five years, fixed. Id.
Black filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the district court had abused
its discretion by denying his motion for a psychological evaluation. Id. The Court of Appeals
agreed, vacated the district court’s sentence, reversed its order, and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Id. at 872, 392 P.3d at 50. Immediately upon receiving the remittitur, the district
court ordered the mental health evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2522. (See R., pp.12427.) That evaluation concluded that Black possessed low levels of psychopathy, “but his drug
addiction appear[ed] to have taken over his life”; and though “[h]is risk to engage in future
physical violence against others appear[ed] to be low … his risk to engage in other general
criminal behaviors appear[ed] to be high.” (Eval., p.8.)
Meanwhile, Black filed a motion to disqualify the district judge for cause. (R., pp.13034.) After a hearing on that motion (5/12/2017 Tr.), the district judge denied the motion (R.,
p.143). The district court again entered judgment against Black and again sentenced him to five
years, fixed. (R., pp.177-79.) Black filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.193-94.)
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ISSUES
Black states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Black’s motion
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 25(b)(4) to disqualify the district court judge
from presiding over this case on remand?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Black to
five years fixed, the maximum, considering Mr. Black’s intellectual disability and
low IQ?
3.
Was Mr. Black denied due process of law when the district court relied at
sentencing upon information that was materially false regarding his criminal
history?
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Black failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
motion to disqualify?
2.

Has Black failed to show an abuse of the district court’s sentencing discretion?

3.
Has Black failed to show that the district court committed fundamental error when it
stated that Black’s (concededly) extensive criminal history spanned “most of the states” rather
than “multiple states”?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Black Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying His
Motion To Disqualify For Cause
A.

Introduction
Below, Black filed a motion to disqualify the district judge from presiding over his

sentencing hearing on remand, asserting that the judge was biased against him. (R., pp.130-34.)
The district court denied the motion on its merits. (R., p.143; 5/12/2017 Tr., p.28, L.20 – p.33,
L.4.) On appeal, Black asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his
recusal motion. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-9.) Application of the correct legal standards to the
facts, however, shows no abuse of the district court’s discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Whether it is necessary for a judicial officer to disqualify himself in a given case is left

to the sound discretion of the judicial officer himself.” Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 149
Idaho 107, 113, 233 P.3d 38, 44 (2009) (citing Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 206, 731 P.2d 192,
201 (1986)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Black’s Motion To
Disqualify The Presiding Judge For Cause
Idaho Criminal Rule 25(b) allows for disqualification of a presiding judge for cause, on

the grounds that the judge (1) is a party, or otherwise interested, in the proceedings; (2) is closely
related to one of the parties; (3) has been an attorney for one of the parties; or (4) “is biased or
prejudiced for or against any party or that party’s case.” When a party seeks to disqualify a
judge on an allegation of bias, that bias must be so extreme as to demonstrate a clear inability to
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render fair judgment. Back v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 791-792, 229 P.3d 1146, 1153-1154
(2010). Unless there is a “demonstration of pervasive bias derived from either an extrajudicial
source or facts and events occurring at trial, there is no basis for judicial recusal.” Id. at 792, 229
P.3d at 1154 (internal quotations omitted).
Below, the primary basis for Black’s claim of bias was that the district judge had
contacted the parties on appeal after the Court of Appeals issued its decision. (R., p.133;
5/12/2017 Tr., p.10, Ls.2-15; p.16, L.24 – p.18, L.5.) The purpose of contacting the parties was
to complete the appellate record with a transcript of the April 1, 2016 hearing, which had never
been requested by the appellant. (5/12/2017 Tr., p.29, L.1 – p.31, L.10.) As the court noted,
there is nothing wrong with a district court ensuring that the record is complete. (5/12/2017 Tr.,
p.29, Ls.20-22.) That Black has sought to make so much of this non-ex parte communication is
curious, as it was his responsibility to include the relevant transcript in the first place. See State
v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34, 981 P.2d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 1999).

Moreover (as the state

acknowledged in its motion to correct the Court of Appeals’ original opinion), inclusion of this
transcript, while completing the record, would have had no effect upon the Court’s legal analysis
and so would not have affected the ultimate outcome of Black’s case. (See Aug., p.2.)
Black also asserted that the judge was biased against him because she denied his motion
for an additional mental health evaluation; because he filed a complaint of judicial misconduct
against the judge; and because he filed a petition of writ of prohibition with the Supreme Court
seeking to bar the district judge from taking any action in his case. (R., p.134.) None of these
allegations showed any bias by the district judge. Upon remand, the district court immediately
ordered the mental health evaluation (see R., pp.124-27); the district judge forwarded Black’s
complaint to the Judicial Council, ensuring review of his complaint after he inadvertently filed it
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with the district court (see 5/12/2017 Tr., p.32, Ls.1-14); and the Idaho Supreme Court
(correctly) denied Black’s writ of prohibition (see 5/12/2017 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-12). The district
judge, correctly finding no evidence of bias, properly exercised her discretion when she denied
Black’s motion for disqualification.
For the first time on appeal, Black asserts that the district judge’s bias was evidenced by
the court imposing upon remand the same sentence as it originally imposed. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.6-9.) This argument was not raised in Black’s original motion to disqualify the district judge,
nor could it have been. On appeal, Black may have raised this issue under fundamental error as
an alleged due process violation, but he has specifically elected not to do so. (See Appellant’s
brief, p.8.) This argument, therefore, is simply unpreserved and should not be considered on
appeal. See State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992); see also State v.
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010) (unpreserved claims of error can only be
reviewed under fundamental error standard).
Even were this Court to consider this unpreserved argument, it still fails.

Black’s

assertions of prejudice do nothing more than state the procedural history of his case and then
opine on “psychological tendencies and human nature.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp.7-9.) As the
Idaho Supreme Court has previously explained, “[i]n order to constitute legal bias or prejudice
[under Rule 25(b)(4)], allegations of prejudice … must state facts that do more than ‘simply
explain the course of events involved in a criminal trial.’” State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 215,
766 P.2d 678, 685 (1988) (quoting State v. Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 701, 747 P.2d 710, 723
(1987)). That a trial judge previously sat on a case and, therefore, necessarily prejudged that
case—even “forming extremely strong opinions as to the sentence which should be imposed”
and being “convinced that the procedure followed and the sentence imposed was correct”—does
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not constitute “bias” under Rule 25(b)(4) and does not require disqualification. Id. The Court
has further recognized that “[a] trial judge is not required to erase from [her] mind all that has
gone before, and indeed, it is doubtful that any human being could.” Id. Rather, the trial judge
must simply conclude that, notwithstanding his or her prior work on the case, he or she can
properly perform the legal analysis which the law requires. Id. Nothing in the record suggests
that the district judge was unable to perform the legal analysis which the law required of her.
Accordingly, the judge’s denial of Black’s motion to disqualify should be affirmed.
The district judge did not abuse its discretion when it determined that it was, in fact, not
biased against Black.

Black has failed to show any indication that the district judge was

incapable of performing the legal analysis the law required of her. Black has failed to show that
the district court abused its discretion by denying his recusal motion. The district court’s order
denying Black’s motion should be affirmed.

II.
Black Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of The District Court’s Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Black argues that, in light of allegedly mitigating factors, the district court abused its

discretion by sentencing him to a determinate term of five years for criminal possession of a
financial transaction card. (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-14.) Black has failed to establish an abuse
of the district court’s sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Moore, 131

Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 873 P.2d
144 (1994)).
7

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Sentencing Black To A Determinate
Term Of Five Years For Criminal Possession Of A Financial Transaction Card
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish that the

sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615
(2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden,
Black must show that his sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker,
136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary
objective of protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978).
While the Court reviews the whole sentence on appeal, it presumes that the fixed portion of the
sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,
726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its
view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
After considering all of the required sentencing factors of deterrence, rehabilitation,
retribution, and protection of society, the district court determined that, in order to protect
society, the maximum sentence of five years, fixed, was appropriate in this case. (7/24/2017 Tr.,
p.26, L.5 – p.27, L.10.)

The sentence imposed by the district court is supported by the

seriousness of Black’s crimes, including those dismissed pursuant to his plea agreement, and his
extensive criminal history.

In this case, Black stole and fraudulently used the financial

transaction card numbers of at least five separate victims. See State v. Black, 161 Idaho 867,
868, 392 P.3d 45, 46 (Ct. App. 2017). And this was not Black’s first crime. In fact, as the
district court correctly explained, it could not “recall seeing an individual who has a more
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extensive criminal history than [Black].

It spans three decades and most of the states.”

(7/24/2017 Tr., p.26, L.20 – p.27, L.1.) Black acknowledges on appeal that his extensive
criminal history includes convictions out of Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, Florida, Alabama,
Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Colorado, Oregon, and now Idaho. (Appellant’s brief, p.16.)
On appeal, Black asserts that the district court abused its discretion by not sufficiently
considering his “intellectual disability and low IQ.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-14.) Black’s
contention that he has a low IQ is based on Dr. Sombke’s evaluation, which used, in part, the
Shipley-2 cognitive function test. (See Eval., pp.4, 6.) As a prefatory matter, the state notes that
the Shipley-2, while a cognitive function test, does not actually claim to measure IQ. The state
recognizes, however, based on Dr. Sombke’s evaluation, that Black appears to have some
cognitive disabilities. Contrary to Black’s assertions on appeal, the district court also recognized
Black’s intellectual limitations and appreciated that those were mitigating. (7/24/2017 Tr., p.26,
Ls.9-14.) However, the court also recognized (consistent with Dr. Sombke’s report) that Black’s
“risk to engage in other general criminal behaviors appears to be high.” (Eval., p.8; see also
7/24/2017 Tr., p.27, Ls.4-10.) Again, the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable
in order to protect society from Black’s continued criminality.
In light of Black’s extensive history of criminality and the primary sentencing concern of
protecting society, Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710, the district court’s sentence of five
years, fixed, is clearly appropriate. Black has failed to show any abuse of the district court’s
sentencing discretion. Black’s sentence of five years, fixed, on his conviction for criminal
possession of a financial transaction card should be affirmed.
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III.
Black Has Failed To Show That The District Court’s Statements During Sentencing Regarding
Black’s Extensive Criminal History Amount To Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Black asserts that the district court violated his due process

rights when it stated during sentencing that Black’s criminal history spanned “most of the states”
rather than “multiple states.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-17.) Review of the record shows no error
in the district court’s statement, much less fundamental error entitling Black to review of this
unpreserved claim of error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts will only review an alleged error under the

fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010).

C.

The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Error When It Stated, Correctly, That
Black’s Criminal History Spanned “Most Of The States”
Because Black failed to preserve his claim that the district court erred by stating that his

criminal history spanned “most of the states” rather than “multiple states” by timely objection
below, he is required to show fundamental error on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at
978. To establish fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to object was
a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless.
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
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Black’s claim of fundamental error fails. First, “[b]efore reaching the issue of whether …
fundamental error occurred at all, it first must be determined whether the district court even
committed an error.” State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). Black’s
claim of error rests on the district court stating, during sentencing, that his criminal record
spanned “most of the states.” (See Appellant’s brief, pp.15-17.) As illustrated by the included
map, this is literally true: Black has hardly consolidated his criminality to one corner of the
country. Rather, with convictions in
the Deep South and Pacific Northwest;
on the Atlantic seaboard and Pacific
Coast; and in the Intermountain West,
Midwest, Great Lakes, and Appalachia
regions, Black’s criminal history in
fact literally spans most of the states.
Black cannot show that the district court committed error, much less fundamental error, when it
stated that literally true fact.
Next, even were the district court’s statement considered under the fundamental error
standard, Black’s claim of error still fails. Taking the Perry prongs slightly out of order, Black’s
claim of error is not clear on the record. Black’s argument, that eleven states do not constitute
most states, relies on an inference: That when the district court said that Black’s criminal history
“spans … most of the states,” it meant that Black had committed crimes in 26 or more of the
individual states (see Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16), rather than the standard dictionary definition
of “to extend across” (see Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary: “Span”). Black’s interpretation is not
the only possible meaning of the district court’s words and, more importantly, a claim of error
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that relies on an inference necessarily cannot be clear on the record. See State v. Stocks, 153
Idaho 171, 174, 280 P.3d 198, 201 (Ct. App. 2012) (“the requirement that a violation be ‘clear’
all but definitively defeats a claim of an implied violation”).
Furthermore, Black has failed to show (assuming his interpretation of the district court’s
statement) that the district court’s mistake of fact regarding the total number of U.S. states is of
constitutional significance.

His claim of error therefore fails on the first prong of the

fundamental error standard. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980 (alleged error must violate
an unwaived constitutional right). Moreover, Black has failed to show (again, assuming his
interpretation of the district court’s statement) that had the district court realized that there were
50 states (not merely 20) and that Black had “only” been convicted of crimes in 11 of those
states, the court would have reduced Black’s ultimate sentence. Black’s claim therefore fails
under the final prong of the fundamental error standard. See Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978
(defendant must “demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings”).
Because review of the record shows no error in the district court’s literally true statement,
Black has failed to show error, much less fundamental error entitling him to review of his
unpreserved claim of error.

Black’s conviction and sentence for criminal possession of a

financial transaction card should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Black’s conviction and sentence for
criminal possession of a financial transaction card.

DATED this 7th day of May, 2018.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 7th day of May, 2018, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Russell J. Spencer
RUSSELL J. SPENCER
Deputy Attorney General
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